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tradition is apt to repeat it for truth." 
HOSEA BALLOU 
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The alleged demise of  classical economics was 
greatly exaggerated in the Keynesian era after 
World War 11.  The supposed death blow was 
the seeming inability of  the purely competi- 
tive model to explain the vagaries of  the busi- 
ness cycle. But in the last two decades, a 
number of  articles have demonstrated that 
fluctuations with many of  the central charac- 
teristics of  observed business cycles can arise 
in "classical" market-clearing models. 
Market-clearing notions are among the strong- 
est in economics, and the New Classical ability 
to explain business cycles has breathed new 
life into the equilibrium approach and many 
of  its provocative conclusions. The existence 
of  business cycles is no longer a reason to ring 
the death knell for classical models. 
Keynesian models have never had trouble ex- 
plaining business cycles. Observed movements 
of  output and prices have shaped Keynesian 
thinking first and foremost, and their models 
have always admitted these facts. Perhaps 
because of  this preoccupation with empirical 
regularities, general equilibrium microfounda- 
tions for Keynesian economics failed to arise 
quickly. Much of  the New Classical rebellion 
against Keynesian orthodoxy in the late 1960s 
and 1970s was understandably inspired by this 
lack of  a strong choice-theoretic basis for the 
neoclassic synthesis (the IS-LM and Phillips 
curve model). Economic theorists of  all schools 
have become less and less willing to accept 
models not derived from explicit maximizing 
behavior in a general equilibrium setting. 
Such shortcomings led to premature eulo- 
gies for Keynesian theories; New Classical 
economists found the inflation of  the late 
1960s and the stagflation of  the 1970s evi- 
dence of  the failure of  Keynesian ideas and 
policies. But the theoretical deficiencies have, 
in large part, been remedied, and indeed, the 
New Keynesian tradition employs more preci- 
sion and adherence to general equilibrium 
rigor than the New Cla~sical.~ 
Both New Keynesians and New Classical 
theorists either implicitly or explicitly are 
searching for the central cause or causes of 
business fluctuations. Economists of  both 
http://clevelandfed.org/research/review/
Best available copy2. For a New 
Keynesian example, 
see Benassy (1 976); 
Malinvaud (1 977); 
Bohm (1978);  or 
Grandmont (1 982). 
For a representative 
New Classical exam- 
ple, compare exist- 
ence proofs in Dreze 
(1975) or in van 
den Heuvel with 
Lucas (1979) or in 
Long and Plosser 
(I 983). Although 
the label "New Key- 
nesian" is not un- 
controversial,  I feel 
its use is warranted. 
First, Keynes states 
clearly in the Gen- 
eral Theory that his 
model generalizes on 
the classical perspec- 
tive. This is a cen- 
tral point of  this 
paper, in reference 
to present-day theor- 
ies. Second. market 
failures are at the 
root of Keynes's mod- 
el. New Keynesian 
theory merely for- 
malizes insights due 
in large part to the 
General Theory. Fi- 
nally, the modern 
authors who devel- 
oped this approach 
(Benassy, Younes, 
Grandmont, and 
Dreze) refer to their 
models as "Keyne- 
sian, "  "neo-Key- 
nesian, "  etc . 
Thus the use of 
"New Keynesian" is 
historically accurate. 
schools agree that many factors are involved, 
but find the rough equivalence of  cycles (in co- 
variances; not in frequencies and amplitudes) 
striking and believe the essence of  the issue 
can be illustrated in relatively simple models. 
When examining Classical and Keynesian 
models of  the business cycle, one is weighing 
the evidence and deciding which fundamental 
insight best agrees with the data. 
For Keynesians, the central cause of  the bus- 
iness cycle has always been market failure. 
The formal definition of  market clearing equi- 
librium, that prices adjust to the attributes of 
agents so that trades balance under desired be- 
havior, is employed by all theorists today. 
This rigorous definition of  market clearing did 
not arise until the 1950s (Debreu and Arrow 
[1954]), and it was not for another decade that 
Clower (1965) clarified the Keynesian idea of 
market failure. This idea was then formalized 
and rigorously established as valid in a gen- 
eral equilibrium framework (Benassy [I9751 
and Dreze [1975]), by the New Keynesians in 
the early 1970s. The basic notion of  market 
failure is that quantities adjust faster than 
prices. Prices then do not clear markets, and 
the entire market-clearing house of  cards col- 
lapses. Such Keynesian models are compatible 
with rational expectations and full informa- 
tion. And they do not rely on "strange" utility 
or production functions; indeed we will see 
that, at present, disequilibrium models are 
more robust than equilibrium models as to the 
specification of  these fundamentals. 
One way to highlight the difference between 
the Keynesian and Classical perspectives is to 
describe their view of  the existing market 
mechanism. Keynesians view this market struc- 
ture as an endowment that, at least over 
moderate horizons, agents must take as given, 
much like their endowments of  various goods, 
such as labor, time, assets, etc. Conversely, 
Classical theorists view the market structure 
as much more fluid; any possibility for gains 
from trade between agents (taking into consid- 
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eration search and transactions costs) can and 
will be exercised. This is reflected in a price 
mechanism that works rapidly and effectively. 
In Keynesian models, the imperfect market 
structure causes business cycles. For Classi- 
cal theory, fluctuations must arise from 
other sources. 
The  essence of  New Classical business cycles 
lies in agents' intertemporal substitution of 
consumption and labor in response to technol- 
ogy (supply) or other shocks. Agents desire to 
smooth their consumption paths and, to a- 
chieve this end, substitute between present 
and future consumption, present and future 
leisure and, intratemporally  , between labor 
and leisure. Combined with very simple tech- 
nology shocks, such a model can mimic ob- 
served business cycles. 
Both schools of  thought, then, have con- 
structed models that "explain" business cy- 
cles in that they reproduce the basic empirical 
regularities of  observed fluctuations. Trans- 
acted quantities of  all goods exhibit high posi- 
tive correlation over time, and quantity move- 
ments tend to persist in the same direction for 
many periods. Further, both generate pro-cycli- 
cal real wages. These are the most basic fea- 
tures of  observed business cycles. 
How are economists to choose which model 
better explains economic fluctuations? Are the 
two theories observationally equivalent so 
that it is impossible to determine which truly 
describes the real economy? This question is 
important, since Keynesian models call for 
activist policy to smooth business cycles, 
while in Classical models these fluctuations 
are desired paths for the economy. 
We will demonstrate that the New Classical 
(NC) model is a special case of  the New Keyne- 
sian (NK) model. Thus, the NC  model can be 
distinguished by the restrictions it places on 
the more general theory. In the decision-theo- 
retic foundations of  statistical scientific in- 
quiry, we can state precisely that there will be 
less risk in working with the NK model, since 
it places less a priori restrictions on parame- 
ters. And although testing hypotheses on these 
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1979) requires mon- 
etary policy mea- 
sures along with 
asymmetric infor- 
mation to constantly 
confound agents to 
produce cycles. 
Given the appear- 
ance of business 
cycles under an  ex- 
tremely wide range 
of  monetary policy 
regimes, in all mod- 
ern economies, and 
for hundreds of 
years, Lucas' model 
cannot be considered 
a general explana- 
tion offluctuations. 
4. In a discrete time 
model, prices are set 
at intervals frequent 
enough so that ex- 
cess demands do not 
change within a 
period. 
highly abstract models is controversial (due to 
lack of  desired statistics, problems of  aggrega- 
tion, and other problems with available data), 
existing empirical evidence casts doubt on the 
a priori restrictions of  the NC  model. 
We illustrate these points by presenting sim- 
ple, but essentially complete, NC and NK  mod- 
els of  the economy and business cycles that'il- 
lustrate the central forces behind fluctuations 
in each. We then discuss theoretical and statis- 
tical arguments for and against each model. 
The models examined are intentionally bare- 
boned; they assume perfect information, ration- 
al expectations, and model only labor and goods 
markets. No assets exist; money is solely a unit 
of  account. 
I. Equilibrium Model 
We choose Long and Plosser's (1983) equilib- 
rium model of  business cycles for its simplic- 
ity; it captures the essence of  the New Classi- 
cal explanation of  economic fluctuations. Un- 
like earlier models, such as Lucas', this formu- 
lation requires no monetary authority along 
with asymmetric information to fool agents 
and jolt the economy into  fluctuation^.^ For 
Fig. 1 Equilibrium model 
One -Period Solution 
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clarity, we assume perfect information and ra- 
tional expectations. Business cycles arise 
from technology shocks and intertemporal 
labor, leisure, and consumption substitutions 
in response to these surprises. 
In equilibrium models, the market works in- 
stantaneously at every date. Prices, although 
theoretically exogenous to households and 
firms, are actually precisely determined by 
the attributes of  these agents. Imagine a rep- 
resentative firm and household with very well- 
behaved production and utility functions. For 
this Robinson Crusoe and Friday economy, we 
have equilibrium at the tangency of  the indif- 
ference curves and production frontier in 
leisure-commodity space. (See figure 1.) 
The key point is the equating of  prices and 
marginal tradeoffs. Consumers equate the 
wage with the marginal utility of  leisure; 
firms equalize wages and labor's marginal 
product. Although there are technical compli- 
cations in extending the equilibrium model to 
a world with many periods, economically this 
approach reduces to applying these marginal 
equalities over time, while correcting for 
interest rates and agents' time preference. 
These marginal conditions are equivalent to 
the traditional notion of  efficiency in econom- 
ics (Pareto optimality); full markets insure 
that all gains from trade are achieved and 
that exogenous (government) policy measures 
cannot improve on this outcome. 
Equilibrium prices at time t,  then, are 
determined precisely by the fundamental 
nature of  agents: endowments and utility (or 
profit) functions. These basic parameters are 
completely summarized by excess demand (2). 
Excess demands of  the agents at time t (2,) 
must determine prices continuously for 
market-clearing equilibrium to hold.4 This 
may seem obscure, but it is important in 
understanding the nature of  New Classical 
price adjustments. The idea can be lucidly 
illustrated by the basic functions involved. 
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tive agent model, 
with only one con- 
sumer, the interest 
rate is determined 
by  his or her rate of 
time preference, i.e. 
p = l/(I+r).  This 
would simplify the 
equations in (5), 
since 9 and (l+r) 
would cancel out in 
the denominators of 
(b) and (c). They 
have been included 
in (5)  to explicitly 
show the role of  r 
and  p in intertem- 
poral optimization. 
The excess demands are constructed by the 
hypothetical process of  calculating excess 
demands (i.e., quantity desired minus endow- 
ment level) at all possible price vectors. So we 
have the function: 
(1)  2, =  Z,(P). 
This function is assumed to have a unique 
root, pT, which gives an equilibrium. But this 
equilibrium price vector p is determined by 
the excess demands. That is: 
Immediately we see that p";s  defined by a 
function of  itself. To avoid any time paradox 
in the determination of  p:  and the root of  2, 
these quantities must be determined simul- 
taneously-instantaneous market clearing- 
at every date. 
Long and Plosser do not develop their price 
dynamics in a full general equilibrium model; 
they limit most of their study to a simple 
example. We will carry the analysis of  the 
general case further, since it lucidly illus- 
trates some of the central issues in equilib- 
rium cycles. 
Consumers have an unchanging utility 
function: 
where L,  represents labor and C,  consumption 
in period t. Instead of  a single-period maximi- 
zation problem, the consumer in this model 
must solve the multi-period problem: 
00 
subject to labor constraints in each period. p 
is the discount factor of  the representative 
agent. Although solving this dynamic maxim- 
ization problem in general is not possible, if 
the utility function is strictly concave and all 
markets are perfect so that there are no kinks 
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in the budget set at any date, then there can 
be no corner solution. In this case, the follow- 
ing first-order conditions must hold: 
where r is the interest rate, W is the nominal 
wage, and Pis  the nominal price of the con- 
sumption good.5 
These are the extensions of  the marginal 
conditions to a dynamic setting. Equation (a) 
intratemporally requires the real wage to 
equal the marginal utility of  leisure; (b) 
equates trade-offs of consumption over suc- 
cessive periods via the rate of  time preference 
p times the price ratio across periods; and (c) 
requires that the labor/leisure decisions equal 
the interperiod wage ratio multiplied by the 
time preference rate. Even though no assets 
exist in the model, such intertemporal trades 
are feasible because of  the rich market struc- 
ture of  the NC  model. For example, there 
exists a contingent futures market for the 
consumption good in period t+s  if  a negative 
technology shock occurs; contracts on this 
market can be purchased with labor services 
in any period between t and t+s. Of  course, 
the price on such a market varies over time 
according to the tastes and technology of  the 
agents. The important point is that the mar- 
kets do exist, and so all trades are possible. It 
is not yet clear that this model will produce 
business cycles. Indeed, since the economy is 
assumed to have a unique and stable equilib- 
rium, w*, the phase diagram (see figure 2) for 
this model in the real wage w  = W/P seems to 
indicate that cycles will not occur: 
As mentioned above, Long and Plosser do 
not attempt to show that cycling occurs in the 
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eral, been shown to produce cycles. To  derive 
concrete results, they specify a utility func- 
tion that embodies the intertemporal substitu- 
tions necessary for NC  business cycles. Long 
and Plosser continue their argument with 
specific utility and production functions: 
Yi,  ,+I  =A  i, ,+1L  4,rI X Tj, 
The standard logarithmic utility function 
has elasticities Oi which are constrained to be 
non-negative, ruling out inferior goods. Pre- 
sumably, if  a Oi is zero, the good has some use 
in production. Otherwise, it is superfluous in 
the economy, since Long and Plosser assume 
free disposal. The Cobb-Douglas production 
function is unusual only in the appearance of 
Ai,t+~,  the stochastic shock to the production 
of  good i in period t. The subscript t + 1  refers 
to the date of  completed production; that is, 
when it is ready for consumption. Xis  the 
vector of  goods used as productive inputs. 
Then, in each period, the consumer maxi- 
mizes expected utility according to: 
(7)  E(UIS,) = E{ ~p"l[O,ln~, 
+  x@ilncitl~,l}, 
where S, = ( Y,, A i,  ,+,). We require maximiza- 
tion under the expectations operator E, since 
A is stochastic. A shock in the technology for 
producing a good will obviously change pre- 
sent consumption. We expect co-movement of 
most goods, since they are all normal-chang- 
es in income call for marginal increments or 
decrements of  each in the equilibrium con- 
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sumption basket. Because leisure is also a 
normal good, some of  the gain or loss due to 
the windfall will be taken in increased or 
decreased work hours. Co-movement is the 
first empirical regularity of  the business cy- 
cle captured by the NC  model. 
Intuitively, persistence arises as consumers 
spread unexpected income changes over time 
as well as over all goods within a period. Sav- 
ings or dissavings due to windfall gains or 
losses (from shocks) are used to increase or de- 
crease income in many future periods. So, 
even without serially correlated shocks, we 
will have persistence in fluctuations. 
The utility function has been the source of 
co-movement and persistence in quantity fluc- 
tuations discussed to this point. Production 
technology is another source of  these business 
cycle characteristics. Since most goods are in- 
puts in the production of  some other goods, a 
technology windfall (disaster) not only in- 
creases (decreases) present and future con- 
sumption of  that good, but also, since all goods 
are superior, some of  the windfall (disaster) is 
used to produce more (less) of  all other goods 
requiring it as an input. Again, it is all part of 
the smoothing over time, as well as among com- 
modities of  any unexpected change in income. 
This leads to cycles, even in response to serial- 
ly uncorrelated technology shocks. 
The real wage can easily move pro-cycli- 
cally in this model. If  tastes are fixed, then 
any increase in output (which requires more 
labor input) drives up the real wage required 
to induce workers to provide necessary labor 
services. As long as any decrease in labor's 
marginal product doesn't dominate this effect, 
the real wage will rise. Since increased output 
is associated with a windfall of  some good 
that can serve as capital (increasing produc- 
tivity), a pro-cyclical real wage seems likely. 
Although observed, it is beyond the scope of 
simple non-monetary models like this to pro- 
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all goods. 
In an elaborate simulation for a six-sector 
model of  their economy (Long and Plosser 
[1983], p. 65) observed the paths for sectoral 
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SOURCE: Long and Plosser (1983, p. 65). 
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and aggregate output shown in figure 3. 
Co-movement of  different goods appears 
clearly. The long swings in the time series in- 
dicates higher degrees of  autocorrelation than 
1, suggesting persistence. 
Long and Plosser's equilibrium model, then, 
can generate three of  the central aspects of  ob- 
served business cycles: quantities in almost 
all industries move roughly together, output 
variations tend to persist for many periods, 
and the real wage moves pro-cyclically. These 
characteristics arise from intertemporal trade- 
offs to smooth consumption along with shocks 
to the production function. 
Long and Plosser emphasize that these are 
not the only factors in the business cycle, but 
claim their model is a "useful benchmark"  for 
evaluating other models. We take this to mean 
what we said at the outset: they are positing 
the central driving force of  business cycles. 
They also point out that, in their model, busi- 
ness cycles are preferred paths; any policy at- 
tempting to smooth these fluctutations will be 
at best Pareto-equivalent with the free market 
outcome and may well be Pareto-dominated. 
11. Disequilibrium Model 
The only departure of disequilibrium models 
from the purely competitive Arrow-Debreu 
framework is the supposition that quantities 
may adjust faster than prices. Taken to the 
limit, this leads to fixprice models in each 
period with quantity rationing to balance 
trades. The market system that the economy 
is endowed with may not permit the perfectly 
fluid media for trade that exists in classical 
models. Some mutually desirable trades may 
simply not be possible under the constraint of 
an imperfect market structure. Dreze and 
Benassy (1975) laid the static foundations for 
this model; dynamic extensions have been 
numerous (see Bohm [I9771  and Kades [1985]). 
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ic fixprice model (as outlined by Grandmont 
[1982], this is called a temporary equilibrium 
framework) and show how business cycles 
arise in it. 
In contrast to figure 1 above, a Robinson 
Crusoe and Friday disequilibrium economy 
can be illustrated, as in figure 4. 
The price vector p, is exogenous within each 
period, so that the unique (under our same 
assumptions of  very well-behaved utility and 
production functions) Pareto optimal Walra- 
sian price vector p outcome almost never 
obtains. Under Po,  the consumer will wish to 
trade to point cp and the producer to point 5, 
so it is not an equilibrium. Instead, we will 
have a new type of equilibrium, a fixprice 
equilibrium. We explicitly demonstrate this 
new type of  equilibrium below. In this out- 
come, in general, one or both agents fail to 
obtain desired quantities at given prices and 
so are rationed. Note that, if  the exogenous 
price vector is p, we have an equilibrium 
model. Here we clearly see that in the static 
world disequilibrium models are more general 
than equilibrium models; they allow for both 
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equilibrium and rationing outcomes. NC 
models maintain that agents will always be 
able to find or create markets that will yield 
market-clearing prices. 
Since the marginal rates of  substitution in 
consumption and the marginal rates of  trans- 
formation in production are not equated to 
prices, this economy lacks the Pareto optimal- 
ity of  the NC  model. Within such a frame- 
work, it is likely that government policies 
could improve the welfare of  all agents. 
We will more fully specify a dynamic dis- 
equilibrium model following Malinvaud 
,  (1977) and Kades (1985a). Cycles occur in a 
more general model here than with Long and 
Plosser; there is no need to adopt specific util- 
ity and production functions. 
We use L,  C,  P,  W, and w,  as in the equili- 
brium model. Consumers are described by a 
1  utility function U that is constrained only to 
be quasi-concave. Our representative consu- 
mer's sole endowment consists of  time that 
may be "spent"  on either labor or leisure. A 
simple concave stochastic production func- 
tion, F(L  ,) +t,  describes the activity of  the 
firm. Consumers maximize utility, and firms 
maximize profits. 
Instead of  assuming that the very special 
Walrasian price vector is found, the fixprice 
approach imagines that the price vector is 
truly parametric at a given trading date and 
will be Walrasian only by accident. Between 
dates, the price vector moves according to the 
so-called law of  supply and demand; excess 
demand for a good in period t (and possibly in 
previous periods) tends to pull prices up, 
while excess supply causes prices to fall. 
This does not restore the auctioneer and the 
instantaneous achievement of  the equili- 
brium price vector. It more modestly posits 
that market forces work in the right direction 
and possibly with lags. Thus, there are other 
forces beyond current excess demands Z(p) 
(and specifically, its root) that may enter into 
the function determining prices. 
It is already easy to illustrate that, dynam- 
ically, NC  models are a special case of  NK 
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variables to enter, such as lagged excess 
demands or even lagged prices. Here are some 
Fig. 5  Firm's Demand (Production 
(10)  ~t=g[AZt+  (1-A)Ztd 
P  t = h [if  (23  + (l-A)P  r 11 
Further, the 2,'s  are allowed to take non-zero 
If  the New Classical special case held in real- 
ity, proper econometric estimation of  equation 
(12) would find that A was statistically indis- 
tinguishable from 1. And only this singular 
result could yield direct evidence that New 
Keynesian theories were over-parametrized. 
Returning to the outline of  the model, there 
is no reason to believe that Walrasian supplies 
and demands will balance at an arbitrary price 
vector in a disequilibrium world. More struc- 
ture must be imposed here to define demands 
and to determine actual transactions. The 
most basic requirement imposed in fixprice 
models is voluntary trade: no agent is ever 
Fig. 6  Household's Demand  forced to trade (supply or demand) more of  a 
(Consumption Expansion Line)  good than he desires-what his preferences 
dictate. Since markets do not clear and we 
disallow forced transactions, agents will have 
to be rationed in quantities at the given price 
vector to balance trades. This model requires 
a new definition of  "equilibrium." 
Fixprice equilibrium means the maximiza- 
tion of quantity-constrained utility and profit 
functions with trades balancing. Disequilib- 
rium Benassy (1975) demands, which we will 
refer to (following the ideas of  Clower) as effec- 
tive demands, are derived from considering all 
constraints except the constraint in the indi- 
vidual market where demand is being formed. 
Economic Review  IVQ:1985 
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L
h+  = MAX u(L,C,w)  subject to  WL  <PC 
C
h+  = MAX u(L,C,w) subject to  WL  <'PC 
Firms: 
L
J+  = MAX r(L, C, w)  subject to  C < F(L) 
Cf+  = MAX r(L, C, w)  subject to  C < F(L), 
We denote them with a + superscript; they are 
defined from the maximization problems: 
where C and L are perceived constraints on 
other markets, and r is the profits function. 
Benassy showed that, when solved, these de- 
mands yield balanced trades while simultane- 
ously determining perceived constraints. The 
perceived constraints are the minimum of  the 
effective demands when the system of  simul- 
taneous demands is solved. Thus agents' max- 
imizing decisions under these constraints bal- 
ance in the aggregate, yielding a fixprice equi- 
librium with rationing. The rationing mecha- 
nism is usually assumed to be stochastic. 
Formally, however, this point needn't be ad- 
dressed in representative agent models. 
We develop some graphs to represent this 
model. (See figures 5 and 6.) We will be using 
graphs to show the behavior of  the household 
and firm in the trade space (L, C). The  firm 
simply obeys "efficient production" in this 
model and always produces somewhere along 
the production function C = F(L).  However, 
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the firm will never produce beyond its Walra- 
sian point (L
J*, Cf*) under the given wage 
and price (the exogenous parameter x) since, 
beyond this point, the exogenous wage ex- 
ceeds labor's marginal product. The shape 
stems from our assumptions on the produc- 
tion function. 
The household obeys "efficient consump- 
tion"; it consumes along a line going through 
the origin (no work, no pay) whose slope is 
dictated by the real wage rate. 
The household will never work beyond its 
notional quantities (L
h*, C
h*) since, beyond 
this point, the marginal utility of  the good 
falls below the marginal utility of  leisure. 
To determine the fixprice equilibrium, we 
combine the two curves. (See figure 7.) 
Beyond the possibility of  a Walrasian equil- 
ibrium (WE) when notional points coincide, 
there are two possible outcomes to this model. 
If  consumers are rationed in selling labor and 
firms in selling the consumption good, then 
we have general excess supply. This has been 
labeled a Keynesian equilibrium (KE). If  gen- 
eral excess demand prevails, we have an infla- 
tionary equilibrium (IE). 
Thus,  disequilibrium Benassy demands give 
rise to a much broader range of  market out- 
comes than Walrasian models, where Z,=  0 in 
all markets. Even at an arbitrary price vector, 
Walras' Law holds for New Classical de- 
mands: excess demand in one market is, by 
definition of  budget constraints, balanced by 
excess supply in another market. General ex- 
cess supply or demand cannot arise even hypo- 
thetically in an equilibrium model. Clower 
correctly stressed that the key to disequili- 
brium models must be to establish a rigorous 
framework within which Walras' Law did 
not hold. This is one way to describe the main 
accomplishment of  New Keynesian theorists. 
The dynamics of  our disequilibrium model 
are very simple, since there is only one state 
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variable, the real wage w. In the state space 
R !,  we have a unique value of  w,  w*,  that 
gives a Walrasian equilibrium. But the 
movement of  the real wage in KE and IE 
regions (on either side of  the Walrasian equil- 
ibrium) is, at first inspection, undetermined. 
In the case of  KE, labor is in excess supply in 
terms of  effective demands, so the nominal 
wage should fall. But the commodity is also in 
excess supply, and so its price also should 
drop. Qualitatively, it seems difficult to 
determine the direction of  real wage move- 
ments. The same holds for IE, where we have 
general excess (effective) demand. 
Elsewhere (Kades 1985b), it has been shown 
that it is likely that steady states exist in both 
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the KE region and the IE region. How does 
this occur? In Keynesian steady states, the 
nominal price of  both labor and the good fall 
at the same rate in the price (vector-valued) 
function. Then the real wage rate is unchang- 
ing, and since it is the only state variable in 
1  this simple model, a steady state obtains. A 
symmetric case explains a steady state in the 
1  IE region. 
Further, all Keynesian steady states of  the 
model are stable (Kades 1985b);  in a one- 
dimensional model, this implies uniqueness. 
Since lagged demands are generally included, 
the WE will almost never be an equilibrium 
(i.e., it is a measure zero event). Inflationary 
steady states may be either stable or unstable. 
Figure 8 presents a typical phase diagram for 
this system. 
This system can easily give rise to cycles in 
the presence of  exogenous shocks to the pro- 
duction function. The system can move 
further and further into either the KE region 
(a recession) or the IE region (boom). It can 
move either towards a stable or away from an 
unstable node until any type of  shock moves 
the system to the other side, changing the 
cycle. The unstable IE effectively marks the 
border between the two regimes. White noise 
shocks can produce outcomes much like those 
observed in real economies. Figure 9 shows a 
simulation of  this model similar to Long and 
Plosser's for aggregate output only. Further, 
this model fully captures the observed co- 
movement of  prices and quantities. By mak- 
ing C a vector, it is easy to show that different 
quantities move together in the model. 
So the fixprice/disequilibrium  paradigm ex- 
plains the most fundamental aspects of  ob- 
served business cycles, and does so without re- 
course to special utility and production func- 
tions. The only reason for such fluctuations 
in the model is the general inability of  the 
market mechanism to always find the market- 
clearing price vector. This economy is en- 
dowed with a cumbersome market structure 
that may or may not accurately reflect reality. 
http://clevelandfed.org/research/review/
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111.  The Evidence 
It is difficult to directly test hypotheses on 
whether or not all markets clear. But we can 
heuristically and formally examine evidence 
and arguments on a number of  issues and 
measure the degree to which equilibrium and 
disequilibrium business cycle models agree 
with observation and rigorous thought. 
The Great Depression stands as perhaps 
the most ITIemorable single twentieth-century 
cyclical swing*  The  ability of a business cycle 
theory to plausibly explain this experience is 
important in establishing its credibility. 
Therefore,  we first discuss the extent to 
which both models can explain this event. 
Pigou and other Classica1 theorists in the 
lg30s  the Great Depression  On  an ex- 
cessive reservation wage rate demanded by 
laborers. Thus for them, recessions were 
caused by a market imperfection in labor mar- 
kets. In a sense, this view stands closer to 
disequilibrium paradigms, although the classi- 
cal notion of  market failure differs substan- 
tially from the New Keynesian view dkcussed 
above. For many early Ke~nesians,  this was 
also seen as the cause of the Great Depression; 
they disagreed with Classical theorists only 
on the effectiveness of  expansionary policies. 
Today's New Classicals must argue that 
recessions occur when low wages are ex- 
pected; workers then find leisure less costly in 
terms of wages foregone and bide their time 
until renumeration rates improve. But can the 
Great Depression best be explained as a multi- 
year  labor markets by most 
Americans because they expected an eventual 
wage rise? The other explanations that New 
Classical theory can offer  seem no more cred- 
ible. One is that the utility function of  most 
laborers called for a ". . . spontaneous out- 
burst of  demand for leisure . . ."  from 1929- 
1939. Another possibility is that a large nega- 
tive shock to production technology was 
responsible, but then the problem becomes 
specifying the source of  this shock. 
New Keynesian explanations of  the Great 
Depression are likewise unconvincing. Iron- 
ically, the most prominent possibility is due to 
Milton Friedman, a theorist not usually asso- 
ciated with ~~~~~~i~~  ideas. ~~i~d~~~  and 
Schwartz (1961) argued that a major cause of 
the Great Depression was the decline in the 
money supply from 1929-1933.  a slightly 
modified version of  our New Keynesian model 
with money (Malinvaud 1977), it can be 
shown that low rnoney-growth rates (or a  for- 
tiori money ,&& declines) are associated with 
Keynesian recessionary outcomes. ~~t far- 
reaching questions have been raised about 
this evidence (Temin 1975) and it is not clear 
which way causation runs between money 
and output. Further, as argued in footnote  3, 
cycle theories based on monetary phenomenon 
are less robust than real theories since cycles 
have occurred under a wide range of  mon- 
etary systems, Perhaps monetary factors con- 
tributed to the severity of  the Great De- 
pression, but their role must be explicitly tied 
into a general model of cycles to provide a 
satisfactory story. Like New Classical theor- 
ies, New Keynesian explanations may point to 
some particularly violent shock as the root 
cause of the Great Depression, but then the 
difficulty becomes uncovering and explaining 
the shock. No convincing explanation has 
been presented. 
Although some economists find merit in 
these heuristic arguments, they are based on 
vague notions and "stylized facts,- and lack 
precision. In a formal  econometric study, Man- 
kiw, Rotemberg, and Summers (1985) test the 
first order conditions in equation (5) for a util- 
ity function more general than Long and PIos- 
ser's. That is, they test the first-order condi- 
tions of consumers! maximization in the NC 
model. Although not sufficient, the first-order 
conditions are still necessary for any interior 
solution; if they are rejected, then the model 
can be rejected. There are, of  course, difficult 
questions of  aggregation in treating national 
data as if  it is created by a representative con- 
sumer. No consensus on a solution to this 
issue exists, and this methodology is, at pre- 
sent, the de-facto standard for empirical work. 
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that the data (NIPA) reject the hypotheses, 
that these maximizations are carried out by 
consumers. None of  the three over-identifying 
restrictions in equation (5) placed by equilib- 
rium models is supported by the data. Further, 
the rejections occur for almost all permuta- 
tions of  the specifications of  the hypothesis 
tests: separable or non-separable utility, 
annual, or quarterly data. Indeed, many of  the 
restrictions actually force the shape of  the 
utility function to be convex, in which case a 
maxima would occur at a corner and the Clas- 
sical tangency conditions illustrated in figure 
1 could not hold. When the utility function is 
concave, either leisure or "consumption" 
(NIPA) becomes an inferior good-which like 
convexity casts serious doubt on the model. 
Simultaneous estimation of  all three restric- 
tions in (5) is similarly rejected and produces 
either a convex utility function or inferiority 
of  either leisure or consumption. 
This rejection can be interpreted in two 
ways. Mankiw, Rotemberg, and Summers ar- 
gue that the data show that markets (both la- 
bor and capital) fail to clear. There is another 
I 
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possibility: the structure of  the utility func- 
tion may be such that intertemporal substitu- 
tion effects are very weak. In this case, a radi- 
cally different utility function must be speci- 
fied to dovetail with observation. At any rate, 
either explanation leads us to question Long 
and Plosser's equilibrium paradigm of-busi- 
ness cycles. It seems that either markets fail 
to clear, or that substantial intertemporal elas- 
ticities of  substitution do not exist; both inter- 
pretations of  the evidence reject this NC ex- 
planation of  business cycles. 
The disequilibrium model cannot be reject- 
ed by any such hypotheses concerning the 
structure of  the utility function; it requires 
only that the utility function be quasi-con- 
cave. Beyond this, the disequilibrium model is 
robust to the form of  the utility function. 
Apart from rejecting the restricted form of 
the utility function needed to generate equilib- 
rium business cycles, there is also strong eco- 
nomic evidence that key markets do not clear. 
Specifically, we shall discuss evidence that 
capital (lending) markets fail to clear. 
Recall from the first-order conditions in the 
equilibrium model (5) that the interest rate ap- 
pears in consumers' decisions just as in any 
other price. Equilibrium models require that 
agents can buy or sell as much of  a good as 
they want at a uniform price, subject only to 
their endowment constraint. This constraint 
prevents any kinks from existing in the agents' 
budget sets so that, with a concave utility 
function, no corner solutions to maximization 
problems exist. 
Keynesians (Old and New) have long argued 
that consumers, in reality, face liquidity con- 
straints: either they cannot borrow at all 
against future income or they must pay an in- 
terest rate greater than the rate they receive 
for lending funds (even accounting for risk 
premia). Figure 10 shows that if  agents lend 
at one price, but borrow at another, they are 
likely to solve maximization problems at cor- 
ners of  their budget set. Here, the equality of 
prices and intrapersonal utility trade-offs 
breaks down, and the economy may no longer 
be efficient. 
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note that asset mar- 
kets are almost al- 
ways assumed to 
more closely approx- 
imate the competi- 
tive ideal than other 
markets. If the data 
show that these 
markets fail to clear, 
then it seems du- 
bious to assume that 
labor and goods 
markets clear. 
Agents are endowed with e=  (el,  ez) of  a 
good in periods one and two respectively. The 
interest rate for borrowing in period one is r,, 
while the lending rate is less, r,. With a con- 
cave utility map, it is then immediately 
apparent that a corner solution can occur. 
Strong evidence exists that such liquidity 
constraints have been binding for significant 
numbers of  American consumers. Fumio Hay- 
ashi (1985), modifying an idea originally ap- 
pearing in Kowalewski and Smith (1979), uses 
cross-sectional data and divides consumers in- 
to high-and low-savings groups. He assumes 
that high-savings households are unlikely to 
be liquidity-constrained, so they may be used 
as a control group to be compared to other (po- 
tentially liquidity-constrained) households. By 
estimating consumption behavior for each 
group separately, and then by comparing the 
two parameter sets, Hayashi finds a signifi- 
cant difference that can be explained by the 
existence of  liquidity constraints. Although 
there are other explanations for the result, 
they require the rejection of either the perma- 
nent income hypothesis or of  market clearing. 
Since both market clearing and the permanent 
income hypothesis embody the New Classical 
idea of  the markets'abilities to smooth con- 
sumption over time, this interpretation too, 
casts doubt on the equilibrium business cycle 
model. Flavin (1981) and Kowalewski (1985) 
provide time series evidence that liquidity 
constraints have persistently shaped agents' 
budget sets in the postwar American economy. 
On the other hand, the disequilibrium model 
is robust to either interpretation of  Hayashi's 
results. If  liquidity constraints do exist, they 
are an instance of  the imperfect markets of 
New Keynesian theory.6 If  we view the results 
as a rejection of  all utility functions that give 
rise to permanent-income consumption paths, 
we already know that the NK  model is not 
subject to this criticism. 
In discussing the compatibility of  both mod- 
els with observed business cycles, we have 
examined only three central patterns: the co- 
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movement of  different quantities, the persis- 
tence of  trends, and the positive correlation 
between quantities and the real wage. But 
there are other empirical regularities in busi- 
ness cycles that both models should similarly 
mimic if  they are to be adequate representa- 
tions of  the central force in business cycles. 
Although they were raised by Arthur Okun 
(1980) in objection to Lucas's equilibrium mod- 
el (Lucas 1972), they also point to shortcom- 
ings in Long and Plosser's model and in NC 
models in general. 
First, many secondary aspects of  labor mar- 
kets (beyond pro-cyclical wages) are at odds 
with the NC  model. Productivity may or may 
not be pro-cyclical in the NC model. It depends 
on the size of  the technology shocks and on 
the intensity of  the disutility of  labor. But 
observed productivity is strongly pro-cyclical. 
In non-market clearing models, this pheno- 
menon is explained by implicit contract the- 
ory, where workers are insured against unem- 
ployment by their employers in return for a 
lower wage. When demand slackens, there are 
no layoffs; with the same amount of  labor and 
less production, productivity must decline. As 
demand improves, the same work force is 
called on to produce more; hence, productivity 
increases. Implicit contract theory comprises 
one market imperfection that could be the 
fundamental source of  fixed prices (wages) in 
the short run. The market clears by a non- 
price mechanism. No institutional factor (that 
is, exogenous parameter) explaining market- 
clearing could produce pro-cyclical productiv- 
ity in Long and Plosser's model. Similarly, 
quits induced by pro-cyclical factors, counter- 
cyclical layoffs (moreover, the existence of 
layoffs, which involve rationing the sale of 
labor), and wage increases in recessions seem 
inexplicable in the present NC  model. 
Although Long and Plosser examine and dis- 
cuss only the consumer side of  their model, 
firms as well as the household may seek to 
http://clevelandfed.org/research/review/
Best available copysmooth over time their objective-profits. One 
rat~onale  for such behavior is that since house- 
holds own the firms, smoothing profits is 
simply one part of  smoothing income. This mo- 
tivation is superfluous in an NC  model, since 
in market-clearing models economic profits 
have, by definition, a zero expected value in 
each period (under the usual assumption of 
constant returns to scale). However, we ob- 
serve very large pro-cyclical fluctuations in 
profits. New Classical theorists must explain 
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why the value of  entrepreneurial talent and 
risking capital fluctuate so sharply with the 
business cycle to lend credibility to their para- 
digm. Conversely, pro-cyclical profits exist 
under implicit contracts in a New Keynesian 
framework, since wage costs are constant 
while productivity varies with business cy- 
cles. However, this criticism must be tem- 
pered by remembering the substantial contro- 
versies in defining and, moreover, in measur- 
ing economic profits. 
Finally, Fisher (1984) has raised a methodo- 
logical objection to the equilibrium paradigm. 
In response to any shock, these models re- 
quire that prices adjust so rapidly-almost in- 
stantly-that agents never face disequilib- 
rium prices. However, even in the world of 
physics, adjustment to a new shock takes 
time, and a mechanical system must move out 
of  one equilibrium before a new rest state is 
attained. Even in the case of  a unique equilib- 
rium, New Classical dynamic behavior vio- 
lates the usual properties of  differential equa- 
tions in avoiding disequilibrium, but we can 
imagine the shock (et) and the real wage (wt) 
move in tandem precisely to produce continu- 
ous market clearing. (See figure 11.)  If  NC 
models contain a dynamic structure as 
rich as the New Keynesian (to avoid the ne- 
cessity of  specifying a restricted class of  util- 
ity functions to produce cycles), then the hy- 
pothesis of  continuous market clearing cannot 
be maintained. (See figure 12.) 
The  system must move through the unsta- 
ble disequilibrium y and cannot give continu- 
ous market clearing. It is not clear why New 
Classical theorists feel that economic adjust- 
ments can be approximated by instantaneous 
They  movements  must provide  from one  an  equilibrium  explicit, testable  to another.  mech- 
anism for this behavior before it can be used 
convincingly. Disequilibrium dynamics call 
for the economy to adjust along paths more in 
line with established notions about change 
over time. 
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Both equilibrium and disequilibrium theories 
can construct model economies that mimic the 
basic behavior of  real business cycles: strong 
co-movement among quantities of  different 
goods, persistence of  quantity movements in 
the same direction for many periods, and pro- 
cyclical real wages. But existing NC  models 
cannot explain other aspects of  observed busi- 
ness cycles, such as pro-cyclical productivity 
or other observed characteristics of  the labor 
market. Further, evidence exists that capital 
markets do not clear. Finally, the data reject 
the New Classical utility function exhibiting 
strong intertemporal substitutions. Without 
such a utility function, the model has not been 
shown to produce persistent output cycles. 
The NK  model is robust to most of  these 
criticisms. It requires no specific utility func- 
tion to generate cycles, it fits the observed 
regularities of  business cycles more fully, and 
it employs a more general model of  price move- 
ments over time. However, like the NC  model, 
it provides no convincing explanation of  the 
Great Depression. Since equilibrium models: 
(1) Comprise a subset of  disequilibrium 
models; 
(2) employ identifying restrictions that are 
not empirically validated; and 
(3) require nonstandard dynamical adjust- 
ments; it appears that, at present, despite this 
shortcoming, New Keynesian theories provide 
Federal Reserve Bank of  Cleveland 
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